Since the 1960s both crime rates and the share of immigrants among the American population have more than doubled. Almost three quarters of Americans believe immigration increases crime, yet existing academic research has shown no such effect. Using panel data on US counties, this paper presents empirical evidence on a systematic and economically meaningful impact of immigration on crime. Consistent with the economic model of crime this effect is strongest for crimes motivated by financial gain, such as motor vehicle theft and robbery. Moreover, the effect is only present for those immigrants most likely to have poor labor market outcomes. Failure to account for the cost of increased crime would overstate the "immigration surplus" substantially, but would most likely not reverse its sign.
immigrants themselves commit fewer crimes than observationally similar natives, immigration could cause an increase in crime if it reduces natives' labor market opportunities inducing them to substitute toward criminal activity. 4 Although there exist extensive literatures on the economics of immigration (reviewed in Borjas 1999 ) and on the economics of crime (see Freeman 1999 for a survey), relatively little is known about the impact of immigration on crime. The existing evidence relies in large part on incarceration rates as proxy for involvement in criminal activity, and is not always consistent. Moehling and Piehl (2009) study incarceration rates of immigrants and natives during the first half of the 20 th century and uncover only very small differences between the two groups.
Similarly, Butcher and Piehl (1998a, 2007) find that since the 1980s immigrants are less likely to be incarcerated than natives, and attribute this finding to positive selection among immigrants.
Immigrants represent a disproportionate share of inmates with drug related offenses (Butcher and Piehl 2000) . While Grogger (1998) finds little evidence for spillover effects, Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2010) argue that immigration caused unemployment and a decline in wages among black men, thereby leading to an increase in incarceration rates for this group. The paper most closely related to the present one is Butcher and Piehl (1998b) . In a panel of forty-three metropolitan areas during the 1980s, they find no effect of immigration on overall rates of crime as well as on violent crime rates. . 5 In the US Census information on the institutionalized population is highly unreliable, as it is often based on administrative data or imputed. In a review of the 2000 Census the National Research Council (2004) found that for 53.0% of the prison population information on country of birth had to be imputed. Jonas (2003) shows that only 19.7% of individuals in correctional institutions filled out the Census form themselves or were interviewed by a Census enumerator, while 56.3% of answers are based on administrative data, and 24.0% result in non-response. While the foreign-born are underrepresented among the institutionalized population in the Census, recent reports by different government agencies seem to contradict this fact. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (2009), for instance, reports that 73.5% of inmates in federal prisons are native born. This means that 26.5% must have come to the US as immigrants. Camarota and Jensenius (2009) provide an overview of existing data on the immigration status of prisoners and known issues associated with this data. 6 There are several reasons for why Butcher and Piehl's (1998b) results are at odds with those presented in this paper. Their sample covers the 1980s, while this papers also considers the 1990s. Tables 8A and 8B indicate that the impact of immigration on crime is concentrated in the latter period. Moreover, Butcher and Piehl do not consider property crime separately from violent crime, and control for the fraction of a metropolitan area's population that is Hispanic, which is endogenous. In their regressions of crime rates on immigration and different sets of covariates the coefficient of Fraction Hispanic is always positive, in most cases economically sizeable, and larger in absolute value than that on Fraction New Immigrants. Note, however, that if immigration increases the native born Hispanic
Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001) this paper instruments for the actual change in the number of immigrants with a prediction thereof based on ethnic differences in settlement patterns (Bartel 1989) . The prediction exploits geographic and ethnic dispersion in the distribution of immigrants across counties as well as the changing ethnic composition of immigrants. Intuitively, validity of the instrument requires that differences in the geographic distribution across immigrant groups, and total inflows of different groups are uncorrelated with shocks to crime in particular counties. The resulting two stage least squares estimates confirm the basic pattern. That is, immigration has a large positive impact on property crime, but not on violent crime.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the social cost of increased crime due to a counterfactual 10% percent increase in the fraction of immigrants amount to as much as 1.7
billion dollars per year. Despite substantial uncertainty associated with this cost estimate, it alone is most likely too small to outweigh welfare gains to immigration produced elsewhere in the economy.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains mechanisms by which immigration can be expected to affect crime. Section III describes and summarizes the data, followed by the main results presented in Section IV. Section V discusses implications for public policy, and Section VI concludes. A Data Appendix with the precise definitions and sources of all variables used in the analysis is available on the author's website.
II. MECHANISMS BY WHICH IMMIGRATION MAY AFFECT CRIME
There are multiple mechanisms by which an increase in the number of immigrants may affect crime. The first and most obvious one is a purely mechanical population effect. Since the expected per capita number of committed crimes is positive, an influx of immigrants increases the total number of crimes simply because it increases the population.
As it is not clear whether policy makers should be concerned about population effects, and since data on the immigration status of victims is unavailable, the empirical work in this paper
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 It has long been recognized that, all else equal, immigration generates a net increase in natives' welfare through its impact on the labor market (see the exposition in Borjas 1999) . Immigration is also likely to increase ethnic diversity in goods and services, and may thereby increase natives' welfare (see Lazear 2000) . On the other hand, immigrants have been found to be more reliant on government transfers (e.g. Borjas and Hilton 1996) . The National Research Council (1997) estimates the fiscal impact of immigration and finds that each immigrant initially creates a burden for the taxpayer. This burden, however, turns into a large surplus over the long run.
does not take population effects into account. Instead it focuses on the relationship between crime rates and the share of immigrants.
Crime rates could be affected by composition effects. Immigrants are disproportionately male and between the ages of 15 and 35 (US Census Bureau 2009), and these population groups are well known to be involved in criminal activity more frequently than others (Freeman 1999).
9
Therefore, an influx of immigrants can be expected to increase crime rates-even if conditional on observables natives and immigrants have equal propensities to commit crime. Becker's (1968) seminal work on the economic theory of crime points to two other mechanisms by which immigration can be expected to affect crime. In Becker's words, "… a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities. Some persons become "criminals," therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but their benefits and costs differ." (Becker 1968, p. 176) Thus, immigration has an impact on crime if immigrants' outside options differ from those of natives, or if the expected utility from committing a crime differs between the two groups. Not only does the total number of crimes change in such a case, but the crime rate changes as well.
The crime rate increases if the marginal immigrant commits more crimes than the average American.
While the marginal immigrant is hard to determine empirically, there is ample evidence that the average immigrant's outside option is worse than that of the average native if legal sector employment is considered to be the relevant alternative. On average immigrants are less educated, have lower incomes, and are less proficient in English than Americans (US Census Bureau 2009). These facts suggest that immigrants' returns from participation in the formal labor market are on average lower than those of natives. Thus, a rise in the share of immigrants in the population may lead to an increase in crime rates. As participation in the formal labor market is a more relevant outside option for crimes motivated by financial gain than for "crimes of passion", it is reasonable to expect this mechanism to increase the property crime rate, but not necessarily the rate of violent crime. 
On the other side, expected costs of committing a crime are arguably higher for immigrants.
Not only do they face the same set of punishments as natives, they are also subject to deportation.
Losing the right to reside legally in the US may be a major deterrent.
Another channel through which immigration may affect crime are spillover effects. Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2010) argue that immigration caused a decline in wages and employment among black men and thereby led to an increase in incarceration rates for this group. Thus, immigration could cause an increase in crime rates, even if immigrants commit fewer crimes than observationally similar natives. Therefore, there are a priori reasons to believe that immigration does increase crime rates, although the direction of the effect is theoretically indeterminate.
III. DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The data set used in this paper is a As is customary in the literature on immigration, a person's place of birth is used to determine his immigration status. That is, the number of immigrants in a county equals the On theoretical grounds data on actual victimizations would be preferable to reported crimes.
However, such data are unavailable at the required level of geographic disaggregation. 16 Since crime serves as dependent variable, underreporting and, more generally, measurement error in the number of crimes will not bias the point estimates unless it is correlated with one of the independent variables. If, for instance, immigrants were less likely to report a crime than natives, then the point estimates would be biased downwards; thus understating the impact of immigration of crime. 17 The fact that the estimated elasticities are robust to using first
In the 1990 Census, for instance, the undercount rate is estimated be 5% for Hispanics compared to .7% for Whites (Hogan and Robinson 1993) . 14 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to using data on arrests instead of reported crimes. Data on arrests are available by race, age, and gender, but no information on the immigration status of the offender is available.
differences instead of levels, even controlling for county fixed effects in growth rates, makes it unlikely that classical measurement error drives the results.
Summary statistics based on the raw, unweighted data for all variables used throughout the analysis are presented in Table 2 . There exists large variation in crime rates across counties and over time. Most violent crimes are aggravated assaults, while the majority of property crimes are larcenies. Crime rates increase until the late 1980s, or early 1990s and decline thereafter. 18 In most cases their variance follows a similar pattern.
The fraction of immigrants exhibits substantial variation across counties, too. As many new immigrants settle in major cities, the share of immigrants increases much faster in the right tail of the distribution; causing it to spread out (see also Figure 2 ). Over most of the sample period 90% of all counties' immigrant share is lower than the national average. This explains the relatively small mean and its modest increase in Table 2 . 
A. Econometric Specification
The preceding discussion suggests a relationship between immigration and crime rates. In what follows this relationship is explored more systematically by using panel data regressions to relate the share of immigrants to county-level crime rates. The parameter of interest is the elasticity of the rate of crime with respect to the population share of immigrants, which is identified by in the following linear model:
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(1)
18 As the data in Table 2 is not weighted, crime rates displayed therein do not match those published by the FBI in Crime in the United States. 19 Tables 8A and 8B demonstrate that the results are qualitatively robust to different weighting schemes. 20 To see that is the elasticity of the rate of crime with respect to the population share of immigrants rearrange (1) to yield: .
Regarding the parameter of interest the two specifications are equivalent. Covariates controlling for changes in demographic composition are the fraction of residents that are female and the median age of the population. The natural logarithm of police expenditure per capita and the log of the rate of institutionalization proxy for police enforcement; while the fraction of families below the poverty line, logged median household income, payroll per capita, and the unemployment rate proxy for economic conditions. The number of new building permits per existing unit, the fraction of housing units that are vacant, the fraction of owner occupied units, as well as the median rent and value of housing units control for factors affecting the quality and availability of housing.
In choosing covariates one must be cautious not to control for endogenous factors. For instance, immigrants and natives do differ on observables such as age, race, ethnicity, and income. By fully controlling for these characteristics would not reflect the true effect of immigration on crime any more. On the other hand, characteristics of a county's population may change over time for reasons unrelated to immigration. To the extent that these characteristics are correlated with crime one needs to control for them in order to obtain unbiased estimates.
The results are qualitatively robust to different parametric assumptions about the relationship between crime rates and the share of immigrants. The log-log formulation in (1) is chosen because it is easy to interpret and fits the data well. E.g. a semi-parametric estimator similar to the one presented by Yatchew (1998) suggests a relationship that is linear in logs. The data clearly rejects a model that is linear in both the crime rate and the share of immigrants. Letting the log of the crime rate or its level be a polynomial function of the share of immigrants yields similar results for most observations in the sample, but for those in the far right tail of the immigrant share distribution. Only for roughly 5% of counties do the results depend on the functional relationship in equation (1). A disadvantage of estimating a model that is linear in polynomials of the immigrant share and includes county fixed effects is that there is very little residual variation in the share of immigrants, which makes the point estimates sensitive to outliers.
The particular set of covariates chosen tries to strike a balance between these two conflicting objectives. The results, however, are not sensitive to specific controls.
At this point it is useful to point out how ! " is identified. By including county and year fixed effects in the econometric model only within county variation from national patterns over time identifies the coefficients. This means that unobserved county characteristics that are constant, or year effects common to all counties cannot bias the point estimate of ! ". Only unobservables that do vary over time and across counties are a potential source of bias, as they might be correlated with the residual variation in the share of immigrant. For instance, new immigrants might, ceteris paribus, be less likely to settle in a county experiencing a crime shock. Section IV.C addresses these issues. Table 3 presents a series of estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to immigration. The dependent variable in columns (1)- (7) is the natural logarithm of the number of property crimes, while that in columns (8)- (14) is the log of the number of violent crimes. Consequently, the coefficients on Log Immigrants in the first seven columns identify the elasticity of the property crime rate with respect to immigration, and the coefficients in the last seven columns identify that of the violent crime rate. The set of fixed effects and the vector of other covariates included in the regression, i.e. , , and , varies across columns. Moving from left to right the set of covariates and fixed effects grows steadily.
B. Main Results
Columns (1) and (8) show the relationship between crime rates and the share of immigrants without accounting for fixed effects or any other covariates besides population. The high indicates that population size explains most of the variation in the number of crimes across counties. Adding year fixed effects in columns (2) and (9) increases the coefficients, but does not change their signs and explains little additional variation in crime. In no case is the coefficient of interest statistically different from zero.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across counties by including county fixed effects changes the picture dramatically. Unobservable county characteristics are highly correlated with residual variation in the share of immigrants. This suggests that controlling for unobservable county characteristics is important in obtaining unbiased parameter estimates. The effect of
immigration on violent crime rates is now positive, but is estimated imprecisely. The effect on property crime rates is roughly twice large, positive, and statistically significant.
The controls for demographics as well as for police enforcement have little effect. The same is true for controls related economic conditions, despite the fact that one might expect economic prosperity to be negatively correlated with crime.
22
One might also argue that immigrants are more dependent on affordable housing than natives, and that high crime rates depress housing prices. Failing to control for this effect would bias the estimated elasticities upwards. Therefore, columns (7) and (14), which display the results of the preferred specification, also include proxies for quality and availability of housing.
The point estimate of for violent crimes is .065 and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The elasticity of property crime rates with respect to the share of immigrants, however, is estimated to be .123 and is statistically significant. This constitutes an economically large effect.
Taken at face value, a 10% increase in the share of immigrants would lead to an increase in the property crime rate of circa 1.23%.
To put this number into perspective, Levitt (1997) finds that a 10% increase in the number of sworn police officers reduces property crime rates by 2-4%; and Levitt (1996) estimates the elasticity of property crime rates with respect to the prison population to be -.321, i.e. a 10% increase in the number of prisoners decreases property crime rates by circa 3.2%. To gauge the size of the estimates it is also useful to convert them into relative crime rates. 23 By this measure an elasticity of .123 implies that immigrants commit circa 2.5 as many crimes as the average native. If differences in arrest rates by gender and age are the same for immigrants and natives, then composition effects can account for at most a ten percent difference in crime rates.
An alternative way of estimating the elasticity of crime rates is by using first differences, i.e.
In the economic model of crime (Becker 1968 ) changes in macroeconomic conditions have an indeterminate effect on crime rates, as they possibly affect both criminals' outside options as well as the returns to crime. Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that changes in macroeconomic conditions have only a small impact on crime rates (see for instance Levitt 2004 and the studies cited therein). 23 To do so one solves a system of two equations in two unknowns, i.e. the crime rate of immigrants and that of natives, in which the two equations are given by 
where denotes the difference between year and for the variable following it, and is again the parameter of interest. 24 With access to only two time periods the parameter estimates of model (1) and model (2) would be algebraically equivalent. Given multiple periods differences arise; especially in the presence of measurement error, which generally affects the first differences model more severely. The fact that the estimated elasticities in Table 4 are close to those in Table 3 , or even larger, suggests that measurement error is not a substantial problem.
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Some of the other coefficients change sign and vary in size, but are often estimated imprecisely.
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 add county fixed effects to model (2). This has the interpretation of controlling for county specific growth rates. Individual counties could be on very different trajectories, which might influence settlement of patterns of forward-looking immigrants, and thus be a source of bias. Controlling for county specific growth rates does not alter the estimated effect of immigration on violent crimes. It remains close to zero. The estimated elasticity for property crimes decreases slightly, but is very similar to that shown in Table 3 and statistically significant. It appears that controlling for existing trends does not change the results in a meaningful way.
C. Causality
The evidence on the impact of immigration on crime presented so far is only correlational. A causal interpretation of the parameter estimates requires the residuals in equations (1) or (2) to be uncorrelated with the (actual) log of number of immigrants, conditional on all other covariates.
There are at least three reasons why this may fail. The first one is measurement error in the number of immigrants. Measurement error would attenuate the estimated elasticities, thus masking the impact of immigration on crime. 26 The second reason is omitted variables bias. For omitted variables bias to be a problem there must be some variable not accounted for in the empirical model for which, conditional on all other covariates, the deviations from its county
In order to avoid loosing circa one third of the sample, if available, data from 1970 are used to calculate differences between 1980 and 1970. Results are qualitatively robust to restricting the sample to that used in Table 3 . 25 Strictly speaking this is only true for classical errors in variables. More general patterns of measurement error may still be present and bias the point estimates. 26 This results is based on the assumption of classical errors in variables. It can be shown, however, that attenuation bias will often result for non-classical measurement error as well.
specific mean and the national average in a given year are correlated with those deviations for the log number of immigrants and the deviations of crime. Depending on the signs of these partial correlations the point estimates might be upward or downward biased. The third reason is endogeneity in the settlement pattern of immigrants. All else equal, one would expect immigrants to settle in counties with lower crime rates. This would introduce a negative correlation between the residual and the share of immigrants, and bias the point estimate of
Estimation using instrumental variables (IV) provides a way to avoid aforementioned problems and obtain an estimate of the causal effect-at least if measurement error is classical and heterogeneity in effects is absent. With heterogeneity in effects, IV estimates a local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist 1994) . That is, the point estimate is a weighted average of marginal effects, with groups for which the instrument is a better predictor receiving more weight. 27 For more general forms of measurement error it is easy to show that the IV estimate are often upward biased-in contrast to the OLS ones which are generally attenuated. Despite the inherent problems with IV, it is desirable to test whether the results for the impact of immigration on crime hold up.
Consistency of the first differences estimator in equation (2) Previous studies in the immigration and wage literature have recognized immigrants' tendencies to settle in ethnic clusters (Bartel 1989) , and used it to predict current period inflows of new immigrants (i.e. Altonji and Card 1991, Card 2001) . The current paper follows this standard approach. That is, the predicted change in the logarithm of the number of immigrants from year ! t "10 to ! t is used to instrument for the actual change.
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) derive the IV weights and show that some of these weights might even be negative, in particular if the monotonicity condition of Imbens and Angrist (1994) fails. 28 In contrast to the first differences estimator, consistency of the fixed effects estimator in equation (1) 
Predicted changes in the number of immigrants are derived based on the assumption that the distribution of new immigrants across counties will be the same as the distribution of immigrants of their own ethnic group twenty years prior. The instrument therefore exploits geographic and ethnic dispersion in settlement patterns as well as the changing ethnic composition of immigrants.
The Data Appendix provides an exact description of how the instrument was constructed.
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The first column of (2005), it is less clear that the second condition is satisfied.
Intuitively, validity of the exclusion restriction requires that variation in the geographic distribution of different immigrant groups, and yearly inflows of these groups on the national level are uncorrelated with time varying shocks to crime in individual counties. Although plausible, this condition is fundamentally untestable.
If one accepts the assumption, then last two columns in Table 5 display estimates of the causal effect of immigration on crime. Although the IV point estimates are estimated quite imprecisely, they are reassuringly close to their OLS counterparts. Taking the IV estimates at face value it appears that the original set of conclusions continues to hold.
D. Implications of the Economic Model of Crime
As hinted above economic theory predicts that the effect of immigration on crime depends on the difference in outside options between natives and immigrants. This means that there should be an effect of immigration primarily on those crimes for which there exists a clear difference between
Briefly, in creating the instrument the set of countries in the raw data has been aggregated into nine groups: Northwestern Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, Mexico, South and Central America, Africa, Canada, and all other countries. Aggregation is required as only a subset of source countries is consistently identified in the raw data. Moreover, aggregation has the advantage of lessening measurement error, which is almost surely present in the number of immigrants from any individual country. County 
immigrants and natives, and that the effect should be larger for immigrant groups whose outside options are lower.
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One can take a closer look at the effect of immigration by estimating the respective elasticities for different types of property and violent crimes. Table 7 shows OLS elasticity estimates with respect to immigrants from Mexico as well as "all other" immigrants. The estimated effect on crime of Mexican immigration is positive, and statistically significant for all crimes motivated by financial gain. The effect of "all other" immigrants, however, is in all cases negative.
Converted into crime rates, the estimates in Table 7 imply that immigrants from Mexico commit between 3.5 and 5 times as many crimes as the average native, while "all other" immigrants commit less than half as many crimes as natives, or even none.
E. Sensitivity and Robustness
Tables 8A and 8B explore the sensitivity of the estimated elasticities across different specifications and a wide variety of subsamples of the data. Only coefficients on Log Immigrants and associated standard errors are reported. The first row in each table displays the baseline results, i.e. those from the preferred specification.
Other factors, such as the severity of punishment, might also differ between natives and immigrants and might mask the effect due to differences in outside options.
The following two rows show that weighting has little influence on the point estimates,
although it does decrease them. In particular, results corrected for missing observations by inverse probability weighting (IPW) are almost identical to the baseline results. 31 Weighting seems to matter only for the elasticity of murder with respect the share of immigrants.
In general, the estimates for murder vary widely across specifications and samples. However, those for other types of crime are much more robust, especially those for crimes motivated by financial gain.
Splitting the sample up by year and analyzing each cross-section separately shows that the effect of immigration on property crimes is concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000. This is consistent with existing evidence on lower labor market returns for this later cohort of immigrants (e.g. Borjas 1990 ).
Of the 124 estimated elasticities for burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery, only 9 do not carry the expected sign, e.g. are negative. If all coefficients were independently distributed-which is an obvious oversimplification-the probability that 9 or fewer of them would be negative is effectively zero if immigration had no effect on crimes related to monetary gain. Thus, one would reject the null that the elasticity of these crimes with respect to the share of immigrants is non-positive. 32 Of the 93 estimated elasticities for murder, rape, and aggravated assault, however, 29 are negative. While this is less than the expected value under the null with independently distributed coefficients (and would still lead to rejection of the null), once one takes into account that the estimates are probably positively correlated the null appears less implausible.
There is some evidence that the effect of immigration on crime in the Northeast differs from that in the rest of the country. With the exception of robbery, all elasticity estimates are negative for this region-often implausibly much so. One admittedly unsatisfactory explanation is that the Northeast receives proportionately less immigrants with poor labor market prospects. For instance, the fraction of immigrants from Mexico is lower in the Northeast, than in the South and
31 IPW weights each observation by the inverse of the predicted probability of having a non-missing value. This is a valid non-parametric correction procedure if the probability of an observation containing missing information does not depend on unobservables. 32 To see this, note that if the effect of immigration on these crimes is zero, then the probability of one coefficient being negative is one half, and the probability of any number of them being negative is binomially distributed. The probability that 17 or fewer of them are negative is given by
,where !!!! !!! denotes the binomial probability mass function for successes given the respective number of tries and a success probability of .5.
the West. However, Tables 8A and 8B also show that the estimated effects are not solely driven by the "classical" immigration states California, Texas, and Florida.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects and to aid in drawing conclusions for public policy, estimates of the social cost of an immigration-induced increase in crime are required. This section performs back of the envelope calculations for a counterfactual increase in the stock of immigrants by 10%.
Following Levitt (1996) , estimates by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) of monetary and quality of life losses due to crime are used to derive the social cost of an immigration-induced increase in crime. These papers attempt to capture both monetary costs, such as property loss, medical bills, decreases in productivity, etc., as well as reductions in the quality of life due to victimization. Estimates of reductions in the quality of life are based on jury awards in civil suits (excluding punitive damages), which are mapped into distributions for a variety of injuries associated with different types of crime. As these cost estimates correspond to the average crime and the average crime might be more serious than the marginal one, they may overstate the cost of the marginal crime. The cost estimates, however, do not include expenses related to victim precaution, legal fees, or losses to employers.
Another important caveat in interpreting the following cost estimates is that they rely on the assumption that the cost of reported and unreported crimes are equal. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey in 2007 less than 40% of all crimes were reported to the police (US Department of Justice 2010). Even serious crimes, such as aggravated assault and robbery, have reporting rates of less than two thirds. Moreover, it is assumed that the elasticity of each type of crime with respect to the share of immigrants is the same for reported and unreported crimes.
This assumption is potentially problematic, as crimes committed by and especially against immigrants might be less likely to be reported. Table 9 presents estimated yearly cost from a counterfactual increase in the share of immigrants by 10%. The values in Table 9 are in 2007 dollars and based on the number of crimes in 2007 as well as the OLS elasticity estimates in Table 6 , rather than the ones obtained from IV. Choosing the more robust OLS estimates is likely to overstate social cost, as-with the exception of robbery-the OLS estimates are about as high or higher than the IV ones (in
particular for murder and rape). For consistency, Table 9 also takes the potential impact of immigration on "crimes of passion" into account. Excluding murder would lower the estimated costs substantially. Consequently, the cost estimates reported in Table 9 should be taken with a grain of salt. They are most likely upper bounds. Another way to put the cost estimate into perspective is to contrast it with estimates of the benefits of immigration (accruing to natives). Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) have estimated an annual gain to the US economy due to the post-1979 inflow of immigrants into the labor Under the assumption that the elasticity of crime with respect to the share of immigrants is constant, the cost estimates in Table 9 can be extrapolated. Between 1980 and 1995, the last year considered by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) , the share of immigrants increased by almost 50%. This yields a yearly cost estimate of approximately 7 billion dollars, which, again, should be interpreted as close to the upper bound. Based on these calculations it seems unlikely that the costs due to an increase in crime associated with an influx of immigrants outweigh the gains produced elsewhere in the economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The economic theory of crime predicts that, all else equal, individuals with lower outside options commit more crimes than others. While immigrants are known to have lower levels of education, lower wages, and higher unemployment rates than natives, previous studies have not found a relationship between immigration and crime, or proxies thereof.
Using decadal panel data on US counties from 1980 to 2000 this paper presents empirical evidence of a systematic and economically meaningful impact of immigration on crime. A 10% increase in the share of immigrants-roughly one percentage point based on numbers from the 2000 Census-is estimated to lead to an increase in the property crime rate of circa 1.2%, while the rate of violent crimes remains essentially unaffected. An elasticity of .12 implies that the average immigrant commits roughly 2.5 times as many property crimes as the average native.
Consistent with economic theory an effect of immigration on crime is stronger for crimes motivated by financial gain, for instance robbery or motor vehicle theft, but not for "crimes of passion", such as rape, and aggravated assault. Moreover, the effect of immigration is only present for immigrants from Mexico, who are more likely than others to have poor labor market outcomes.
The last year taken into account by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) is 1995. Since immigration continued to increase, their estimate understates the current welfare gain to immigration. Somewhat ironically the "immigration surplus" rises with its (negative) impact on wages (see Borjas 1999 for an exposition), which means that the welfare gain to immigration increases with the price elasticity of labor demand. The number of reported offenses is available for the seven Index I crimes: murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The FBI classifies the first four of these as violent crimes; the latter three are denoted property crimes. A single reported incident involving different crimes is scored only once. It is counted only under the most serious crime involved. E.g. two offenders breaking into a car dealership killing the night guard in the process would be counted as one homicide, not as burglary. See U.S. Department of Justice (2004) for a detailed guide on scoring and classifying offenses.
Data on reported crimes are available at the national, state, county, and agency level. Due to changes in the imputation procedures in 1994 county level data before and after 1994 are not comparable. This necessitates the use of agency level data, which has to be appropriately adjusted for non-reporting by police agencies and aggregated to the county level. That is, if a police agency submits reports for at least 1 month, but less than 12, in a given year, the total number of crimes it reports for this year is inflated by a factor of . Agencies reporting 0 months are not considered. An alternative way of adjusting for non-reporting suggested by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) is to inflate the number of reported crimes for agencies submitting reports for at least 3 months by a factor of , and to assign an imputed value to agencies reporting 2 or fewer months. NACDJ uses the mean value of agencies reporting 12 months in the same geographic stratum for its imputations. 36 This method has the downside that it introduces substantial correlation in the error terms across counties. The results of the paper remain qualitatively unchanged when using this alternative adjustment mechanism.
Aggregating agency level crime data to the county level is done by adding the adjusted number of crimes of all agencies in a given county. ICPSR Study No. 4634 provides a crosswalk between agency identifiers (ORI) and county codes (FIPS).
To avoid loosing approximately one third of the sample, data for 1970 (distributed in ICPSR Study No. 4198) has been used in estimating the first differences models in Tables 4 and 5. For the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 the following variables are used in the analysis:
Violent Crimes is the sum of all murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies known to police in a given county during a particular year.
Murder refers to the crime of murder and non-negligent manslaughter and is defined as the willful non-negligent killing of a human being by another one.
See the description at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html> for details.
Rape refers to the crime of rape by force. Rape by force defined as the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly against her will, where carnal knowledge is the act of a man having sexual intercourse with a woman.
Aggravated Assault is defined as an unlawful attack by one person upon another one for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury. Aggravated assaults are often accompanied by the use of a weapon.
Robbery is defined as the taking or attempt to take anything valuable from its owner or custodian by force, threat of force, or intimidation. Both armed and unarmed robberies are subsumed in this category.
Property Crimes is the sum of all burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts known to police in a given county during a particular year.
Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry into a structure with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Forcible entry, unlawful entry without the use of force, and attempted forcible entry are subsumed in this category.
Larceny, or theft, is defined as the unlawful taking away of property from the possession of its owner or custodian. Pocket-picking, purse-snatching, shoplifting, thefts from motor vehicles, thefts of motor vehicle parts and accessories, theft of bicycles, theft from buildings, theft from coin-operated devices or machines, etc. are included in this category.
Motor Vehicle Theft is defined as the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle is defined as a self-propelled vehicle running on land surface and not on rails. County level information for different years has been merged on FIPS codes. Counties that could not be matched consistently over time have been dropped from the analysis. The final sample includes 3,117 counties.
B. County Level Covariates
Below follows a description of each variable used in the analysis, and its original source.
See <http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml>.
Immigrants is defined as the number of foreign-born individuals in a given county during a particular year. Information on the foreign-born is contained in the 1970, 1980, 1990 Payroll per Capita is defined as the as the total private non-farm annual payroll, inflated to 2000 dollars (using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers), divided by the total number of residents in a given county and a particular year. It is based on information collected 
C. Construction of Instrument
County level information on the number of immigrants from different source countries by decade (based on the respective US Census) is distributed by the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). Data for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 have been obtained from this source, and have been merged with the previously described data.
In creating the instrument the set of countries in the raw data has been aggregated up into nine groups: Northwestern Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, Mexico, South and Central America, Africa, Canada, and all other countries. Aggregation is required as only a subset of source countries is consistently identified in the raw data, whereas especially in earlier years information on other countries has already been aggregated. Moreover, aggregation has the advantage of lessening measurement error, which is almost surely present in the number of immigrants from any individual country. The total number of immigrants in each group for the US as a whole as well as for each county separately has been determined for each year, i.e. Source: Author's calculations based on U.S. Census data. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 fall of Soviet Union & Immigration Act of 1990 Notes: The scale of the ordinate is logarithmic. Crime rates are defined as the number of offenses reported to the police per 100,000 residents. Violent crimes is the sum of reported murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies. Property crimes is the sum of reported burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts. (1), by population weighted least squares (OLS), and estimating euqation (2) by two-stage least squares (IV). The instrument is the same as in Table 5 . The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the crime listed next to the respetive coefficient. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
Independent Variables: Table 6 (assuming  that the Table 91 ). The estimates of the costs of crime are from Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) , adjusted to 2007 dollars using the CPI. The final column displays the estimated social cost of a 10% increase in the stock of immigrants due to changes in each type of crime, combining changes in reported and unreported crime. Numbers have been rounded. 
